

# No-Contest Elections<sup>TM</sup>

A report on the lack of voter control in Minnesota's state legislative elections, predicting the results a year in advance of the November 2000 elections

By FairVote Minnesota

November 2, 1999  
About FairVote Minnesota

FairVote Minnesota is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, which educates the public about alternative election systems and promotes those that show promise for improving democracy, especially proportional representation. Proportional representation is the principle that each voter can help elect someone he or she approves of, and groupings of like-minded voters are represented in proportion to their share of the vote.

From coffee shop conversations about how to work for better democracy, FairVote Minnesota began as an effort of grassroots activists and is now establishing itself as a long-term presence working for better democracy in this state. Qualities contributing to better democracy include greater participation, a focus on substantive discussion of issues, better representation, and improved accountability.

The report was researched and written by Tony Anderson Solgård, Ken Bearman, and David Shove. The authors thank Rob Richie, executive director of the Center for Voting and Democracy, for his assistance in planning this report. The Center for Voting and Democracy is a Washington DC-based nonpartisan, nonprofit educational organization that studies the American electoral process. The Center publishes a report, “Monopoly Politics,” which assesses the competitiveness of US congressional elections.

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What the analysts are saying about “No-Contest Elections”

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## Introduction

### What’s wrong with non-competitive elections?

In this report, we contend that Minnesota has non-competitive elections. Before we demonstrate that, let’s ask the question, “What’s wrong with non-competitive elections?” Our answer: “Plenty!” Here’s a sampling.

### **Undemocratic**

The fundamental principle of democracy is that voters should decide the outcome of an election. In Minnesota's state legislative elections, the outcome is virtually predetermined two-thirds of the time. The effect can be magnified and engineered to the advantage of the party that controls the redistricting process, further removing control from the voters.

### **Unresponsive/unaccountable to voters**

A shift in voter preference should be reflected in the composition of the legislature. That does not happen readily in Minnesota legislative elections. "Safe" seats insulate the elected from the voters. Those elected from safe seats do not need to pay attention to the wishes of their constituents in order to be reelected. On Election Day, if a voter prefers the party of the incumbent, there is little choice but to vote for that party's candidate, even if that candidate has not been adequately responsive to the needs of the district.

### **Unfair to competitive areas and state as a whole**

Political power gravitates to the safest seats. This punishes areas where there is competition between the parties and where good candidates from both parties are going in and out of the legislature with some regularity. And because the safest seats are by definition held by the least accountable legislators, the state as a whole does not have the benefit of accountable committee chairs and party leadership.

### **Balkanizes the state, intensifies partisanship**

A party with no real chance of winning a particular seat in the legislature will have little incentive to attend to the needs of that district. Party preferences tend to extend across entire regions of the state, with Democrats dominating Minneapolis and St. Paul and the northern region and Republicans doing well in the suburbs and southeastern part of the state. When parties have no reason to work together, they do not. Partisan bickering is amplified. The interests of various regions are divided against each other.

### **Excludes most voters from the campaign**

The real election contest is waged for the support of the few swing voters in the few competitive districts in the state. What the rest of the state thinks is of little consequence.

### **Lessens voter participation**

Given the above conditions, it is not surprising that fewer and fewer turn out to vote. We suspect that many people intuitively understand that their votes do not affect the outcome. The results of this study confirm that understanding.

Some of these concerns will be the subject of future investigations. This report will focus on assessing the level of competitiveness in state legislative elections.

## **Voter behavior**

It is well established in political science literature that voters tend to vote according to their party preferences. These preferences tend to be constant over time. Therefore, if more of the voters in any given district are inclined to vote for one party over another, the preferred party will prevail in most election contests. The greater the percentage of voters who share a preference for the dominant party, the “safer” are the candidates representing that party in their election contests.

Districts in which the percentage of the vote separating the winning party and the second place party averages less than 10 percent are traditionally described as “marginal,” meaning the election could be won by either of the two largest parties. If that percentage is between 10 percent and 20 percent, the district is considered “safe” for the dominant party. The district is called a “landslide” district if the dominant party generally wins by 20 percent or more of the vote. In this report, these profiles are given the terms “leaning” toward one party or another, “comfortable,” and “untouchable,” respectively.

## **Methodology**

This report used a standard method of electoral analysis, measuring party strength, as the basis for assessing the level of competitiveness in Minnesota’s legislative elections and making predictions for election outcomes. Election results were taken for each legislative and senate district from the Legislative Manual published by the Minnesota Secretary of State for DFL, GOP, Reform, and “Other” candidates in the following elections:

- 1994: state representative, US representative, US senator
- 1996: state representative, state senator, US representative, US president
- 1998: state representative, US representative, state governor

The data were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The percentage of the vote received by each candidate was calculated. If a party did not field a candidate in that election, it was calculated to be “zero percent.” The average percent of the vote received by each party was calculated for each election year. Where a percentage was “zero,” that was included in the yearly average. From this database the following calculations and categorizations were made:

*Two-Year Party Average Percent* – Each party’s yearly average percent was averaged with another year’s figures to arrive at a measurement of party strength.

For the demonstration of the model (described below), the 1994 and 1996 figures were used to get determine party strength. For the prediction of the 2000 elections (described below), 1996 and 1998 figures were used.

*DFL-GOP Party Strength Difference* - The difference was calculated between the DFL party strength and the GOP party strength (DFL % minus GOP %).

*District Profile* – Each district was categorized according to its party strength difference:

<u>Calculation of difference between two-year averages of DFL and GOP</u>			<u>Category</u>
20% <=	difference		Untouchable DFL
10% <=	difference	< 20%	Comfortable DFL
0% <	difference	< 10%	Leaning DFL
-10% <	difference	< 0%	Leaning GOP
-20% <	difference	<= -10%	Comfortable GOP
	difference	<= - 20%	Untouchable GOP

*Predicted Winner* - The elections for state representative and state senator in districts categorized as either “Untouchable” or “Comfortable” for a party were predicted to be won by that party. The districts categorized as “Leaning” one way or the other were not predicted, or “Not called.”

*Reform Party Potential Impact* - In the predictions of the 2000 elections, the districts with potential for a Reform Party candidate to affect the results were selected by subtracting the absolute value of “96-98 DFL-GOP difference” from “96-98 Reform Avg. %.” The districts in which the difference between these two figures was greater than zero were assessed to have the greatest potential for Reform Party impact.

By “impact,” we mean that the presence of a Reform Party candidate would make it likely that the election would be decided by less than a majority of the voters. These are districts where the Reform Party’s strength is high while neither the DFL nor the GOP dominates.

## **Demonstration of Model**

In the following tables, the districts are sorted on the values in column 6, “94-96 DFL-GOP difference,” (the value in column 2 minus the value in column 3). To the right of column 6 are the district profiles, the analytical model’s prediction of the 1998 elections, the actual result, and finally, a notation as to whether the model’s prediction was right or wrong. For both the state house and state senate, we were able to predict election results in approximately two-thirds of the districts with 95 percent accuracy using this model.

By sorting the tables in this way, it becomes visually apparent that there is a close correlation between the average party percentage and the winner of the next election. The opposing party won no “Untouchable” districts in 1998. Forty-two percent of the state house elections were in “Untouchable” districts.

### Comparison of model prediction with actual results: Minnesota House of Representatives

District	94-96 DFL Avg. %	94-96 GOP Avg. %	94-96 Reform Avg. %	94-96 Other Avg. %	94-96 DFL-GOP Difference	94-96 District Profile	98 Predicted State House Winner	98 Actual State House Winner	Winner's Percent	Accuracy
34B	24.5%	73.0%	2.5%	0.0%	-48.6%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	100.0%	Right
41A	26.1%	72.1%	1.7%	0.0%	-46.0%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	100.0%	Right
31A	27.2%	69.2%	1.1%	2.5%	-42.0%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	74.0%	Right
42B	28.2%	69.8%	1.8%	0.2%	-41.6%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	73.8%	Right
42A	29.3%	69.1%	1.6%	0.0%	-39.8%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	64.6%	Right
33B	30.4%	66.6%	3.0%	0.0%	-36.2%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	56.2%	Right
37A	31.1%	66.7%	2.2%	0.0%	-35.7%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	62.8%	Right
43B	31.7%	66.2%	2.1%	0.0%	-34.6%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	73.1%	Right
30A	32.9%	66.0%	1.1%	0.0%	-33.0%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	100.0%	Right
45A	32.2%	65.1%	2.7%	0.0%	-32.9%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	64.8%	Right
43A	32.6%	64.7%	2.4%	0.2%	-32.1%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	67.5%	Right
31B	33.7%	65.4%	0.9%	0.0%	-31.8%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	60.2%	Right
38B	33.1%	64.7%	2.2%	0.0%	-31.7%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	68.2%	Right
41B	33.8%	64.0%	2.2%	0.0%	-30.3%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	67.9%	Right
20A	34.2%	62.8%	2.5%	0.5%	-28.7%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	68.7%	Right
30B	34.1%	62.0%	3.9%	0.0%	-28.0%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	66.5%	Right
36B	35.5%	62.5%	2.0%	0.0%	-27.0%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	67.0%	Right
28B	36.0%	62.6%	1.4%	0.0%	-26.5%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	74.6%	Right
33A	34.8%	60.6%	4.6%	0.0%	-25.8%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	64.3%	Right
32B	36.1%	61.8%	2.1%	0.0%	-25.7%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	100.0%	Right
23A	36.2%	61.7%	1.7%	0.4%	-25.5%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	62.8%	Right
10B	37.1%	61.5%	1.4%	0.0%	-24.4%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	53.5%	Right
35A	36.4%	60.0%	2.9%	0.7%	-23.5%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	79.3%	Right
34A	36.8%	60.0%	3.0%	0.2%	-23.2%	Untouchable	GOP	GOP	57.5%	Right
28A	39.6%	58.9%	1.5%	0.0%	-19.3%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	67.9%	Right
26A	39.5%	58.7%	1.4%	0.3%	-19.2%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	100.0%	Right
37B	39.7%	57.8%	2.4%	0.1%	-18.2%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	59.1%	Right
20B	39.5%	56.2%	3.5%	0.7%	-16.7%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	56.2%	Right
53A	41.7%	55.6%	2.5%	0.2%	-13.9%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	61.2%	Right
45B	41.7%	55.5%	2.8%	0.0%	-13.8%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	68.4%	Right
40B	42.2%	55.8%	1.9%	0.0%	-13.6%	Comfortable	GOP	DFL	55.1%	Wrong
21A	43.4%	54.9%	1.4%	0.3%	-11.5%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	69.0%	Right
50B	43.1%	54.1%	2.8%	0.0%	-11.1%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	64.6%	Right
29B	44.0%	54.5%	1.5%	0.0%	-10.5%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	63.7%	Right
49A	42.9%	53.4%	3.6%	0.0%	-10.5%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	51.2%	Right
48A	43.5%	53.6%	2.9%	0.0%	-10.1%	Comfortable	GOP	GOP	57.6%	Right
14A	44.2%	54.1%	1.7%	0.0%	-9.9%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	57.9%	Not called
36A	44.1%	53.9%	2.0%	0.0%	-9.8%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	56.1%	Not called
16B	44.4%	54.0%	1.6%	0.0%	-9.6%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	63.9%	Not called
23B	43.9%	53.4%	2.3%	0.5%	-9.5%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	66.4%	Not called
56A	44.2%	53.5%	2.3%	0.0%	-9.4%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	64.4%	Not called
51B	44.1%	53.2%	2.7%	0.0%	-9.1%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	57.9%	Not called
53B	44.0%	53.1%	2.6%	0.3%	-9.1%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	61.4%	Not called
09A	45.4%	54.0%	0.6%	0.0%	-8.5%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	78.2%	Not called
25B	45.0%	53.3%	1.7%	0.0%	-8.3%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	58.8%	Not called
19B	44.2%	52.1%	3.2%	0.5%	-8.0%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	63.3%	Not called
38A	45.0%	52.9%	2.1%	0.1%	-7.9%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	56.2%	Not called
19A	44.0%	51.3%	4.2%	0.5%	-7.4%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	60.5%	Not called
11A	46.2%	52.9%	0.9%	0.0%	-6.7%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	100.0%	Not called
56B	45.8%	51.9%	2.3%	0.0%	-6.1%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	66.5%	Not called
55A	45.4%	51.4%	2.8%	0.4%	-6.0%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	67.0%	Not called
17A	45.5%	51.4%	3.2%	0.0%	-5.9%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	53.9%	Not called
14B	46.2%	52.0%	1.8%	0.0%	-5.8%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	72.6%	Not called
10A	46.9%	52.0%	1.0%	0.0%	-5.1%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	64.5%	Not called
21B	47.1%	51.5%	1.1%	0.4%	-4.3%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	61.6%	Not called
29A	47.3%	50.9%	1.8%	0.0%	-3.6%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	69.7%	Not called
50A	47.8%	49.3%	2.9%	0.0%	-1.4%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	56.4%	Not called
27A	49.1%	49.8%	1.1%	0.0%	-0.7%	Leaning	GOP	Not called	53.2%	Not called
15B	48.4%	47.9%	3.3%	0.4%	0.5%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	62.0%	Not called
47A	49.3%	48.2%	2.5%	0.0%	1.1%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	50.7%	Not called
17B	48.8%	47.4%	3.8%	0.0%	1.4%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	55.3%	Not called
15A	49.9%	48.0%	1.7%	0.3%	1.9%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	58.4%	Not called
40A	50.4%	47.5%	2.1%	0.0%	2.8%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	51.4%	Not called
04A	50.8%	47.6%	1.6%	0.0%	3.1%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	49.2%	Not called
25A	50.7%	47.6%	1.6%	0.1%	3.1%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	53.7%	Not called
11B	50.7%	47.5%	1.7%	0.0%	3.2%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	66.7%	Not called
52B	50.1%	46.1%	3.4%	0.4%	3.9%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	48.6%	Not called
44A	50.8%	46.7%	2.5%	0.0%	4.0%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	53.1%	Not called
47B	51.0%	46.9%	2.2%	0.0%	4.1%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	61.3%	Not called
18A	50.5%	46.1%	3.4%	0.0%	4.4%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	53.8%	Not called
26B	52.4%	46.5%	1.1%	0.0%	5.8%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	61.0%	Not called
51A	51.9%	45.5%	2.6%	0.0%	6.4%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	52.8%	Not called
04B	51.9%	45.4%	2.7%	0.0%	6.5%	Leaning	DFL	Not called	50.8%	Not called

District	94-96 DFL Avg. %	94-96 GOP Avg. %	94-96 Reform Avg. %	94-96 Other Avg. %	94-96 DFL-GOP Difference	94-96 District Profile	98 Predicted State House Winner	98 Actual State House Winner	Winner's Percent	Accuracy
16A	52.5%	45.8%	1.7%	0.0%	6.7%	Leaning DFL	Not called	DFL	63.6%	Not called
24B	53.0%	45.4%	1.5%	0.2%	7.6%	Leaning DFL	Not called	GOP	46.2%	Not called
22B	52.5%	44.9%	1.2%	1.4%	7.7%	Leaning DFL	Not called	GOP	67.1%	Not called
44B	53.2%	44.3%	2.5%	0.0%	9.0%	Leaning DFL	Not called	GOP	62.4%	Not called
09B	54.3%	45.0%	0.8%	0.0%	9.3%	Leaning DFL	Not called	GOP	58.5%	Not called
49B	52.9%	43.6%	3.5%	0.0%	9.3%	Leaning DFL	Not called	DFL	50.6%	Not called
54A	53.8%	43.8%	2.1%	0.3%	10.0%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	52.9%	Right
57A	53.6%	43.4%	2.9%	0.1%	10.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	GOP	50.8%	Wrong
01B	55.2%	44.1%	0.7%	0.0%	11.1%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	GOP	56.2%	Wrong
24A	55.2%	43.6%	1.2%	0.0%	11.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	58.5%	Right
32A	55.5%	43.8%	0.7%	0.0%	11.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	61.5%	Right
01A	55.7%	43.5%	0.8%	0.0%	12.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	58.6%	Right
35B	54.1%	42.0%	3.2%	0.7%	12.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	GOP	51.6%	Wrong
54B	54.7%	42.4%	2.5%	0.4%	12.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	61.0%	Right
12A	55.2%	42.6%	2.1%	0.0%	12.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	54.0%	Right
52A	55.3%	42.5%	2.2%	0.0%	12.7%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	55.9%	Right
13A	53.3%	39.5%	1.2%	6.0%	13.7%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	GOP	63.6%	Wrong
46A	56.1%	41.7%	2.1%	0.0%	14.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	51.2%	Right
48B	55.6%	41.3%	3.1%	0.0%	14.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	59.7%	Right
18B	55.8%	40.8%	3.4%	0.0%	15.0%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	51.4%	Right
55B	56.0%	40.8%	2.8%	0.4%	15.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	60.5%	Right
12B	56.9%	40.8%	2.3%	0.0%	16.1%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	63.0%	Right
39A	56.7%	40.6%	2.3%	0.4%	16.1%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	56.9%	Right
02B	57.6%	41.4%	1.0%	0.0%	16.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	54.3%	Right
46B	57.1%	40.7%	2.2%	0.0%	16.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	58.2%	Right
63B	57.5%	40.5%	2.0%	0.0%	17.1%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	56.3%	Right
22A	58.6%	40.0%	1.1%	0.3%	18.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	59.2%	Right
02A	59.1%	40.1%	0.8%	0.0%	19.0%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	63.6%	Right
13B	56.3%	37.0%	1.5%	5.1%	19.3%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	71.1%	Right
57B	58.5%	38.2%	3.3%	0.0%	20.3%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	61.4%	Right
39B	59.4%	37.9%	2.5%	0.2%	21.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	66.6%	Right
27B	61.5%	37.8%	0.7%	0.0%	23.6%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	72.5%	Right
08B	60.9%	36.6%	2.5%	0.0%	24.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	59.5%	Right
06B	61.5%	35.0%	3.5%	0.0%	26.4%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	54.0%	Right
67B	61.8%	34.1%	3.6%	0.5%	27.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	59.9%	Right
64B	62.6%	34.3%	2.0%	1.1%	28.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	60.7%	Right
63A	63.8%	34.3%	1.8%	0.0%	29.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	65.8%	Right
06A	63.7%	33.4%	2.8%	0.0%	30.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	72.6%	Right
07B	63.8%	33.0%	3.1%	0.0%	30.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	62.7%	Right
08A	64.9%	33.0%	2.0%	0.0%	31.9%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	67.8%	Right
03B	65.2%	32.5%	2.3%	0.0%	32.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	61.4%	Right
03A	65.4%	32.2%	2.4%	0.0%	33.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	66.4%	Right
66B	65.3%	31.7%	2.2%	0.8%	33.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	70.3%	Right
67A	65.4%	30.6%	3.4%	0.6%	34.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	58.8%	Right
58A	65.0%	29.0%	2.1%	4.0%	36.0%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	69.2%	Right
59A	68.1%	29.8%	2.1%	0.0%	38.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	63.3%	Right
64A	68.1%	29.2%	2.0%	0.7%	38.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	73.2%	Right
62B	68.2%	29.0%	2.8%	0.0%	39.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	69.3%	Right
59B	69.0%	27.7%	3.3%	0.0%	41.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	69.1%	Right
65B	69.1%	27.8%	2.3%	0.8%	41.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	70.5%	Right
07A	67.4%	24.1%	3.9%	4.6%	43.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	67.1%	Right
60A	67.7%	23.3%	1.3%	7.6%	44.4%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	70.2%	Right
05B	71.4%	26.7%	1.9%	0.0%	44.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	75.5%	Right
66A	70.2%	25.2%	2.6%	2.0%	45.0%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	69.3%	Right
60B	72.8%	25.6%	1.6%	0.0%	47.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	68.2%	Right
05A	72.5%	25.2%	2.3%	0.0%	47.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	74.6%	Right
62A	72.4%	22.2%	2.4%	3.1%	50.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	77.5%	Right
65A	78.2%	19.3%	1.7%	0.7%	58.9%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	78.7%	Right
61A	79.0%	19.8%	1.2%	0.0%	59.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	82.5%	Right
58B	80.4%	18.7%	0.9%	0.0%	61.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	82.4%	Right
61B	81.2%	17.5%	1.3%	0.0%	63.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	74.3%	Right
						32 Untouchable DFL			Right	86
						24 Untouchable GOP			Wrong	5
						23 Comfortable DFL			Not called	43
						12 Comfortable GOP			Percent called	67.9%
						91 Predictable Seats			Accuracy	94.5%

Three of the five cases where the model was wrong show a limitation of the moving average method of analysis. The analysis, and thus the prediction, will lag behind the current reality where there have been changes in the district profile. Representatives Ann Lenczewski (DFL-40B), Jim Seifert (GOP-57A), and Mark Buesgens (GOP-35B) were newly elected in

1998 in suburban districts which were profiled as “comfortable” for the other party. They are profiled as “Leaning” toward the other party for 2000.


In the 1996 state house election in district 35B, the Republicans did not field a candidate. This skewed the party strength figures and nudged the party strength difference over the 10 percent threshold for categorizing a district as “comfortable” rather than “leaning.”

Note that the GOP managed to win control of the House of Representatives in 1998 even though they were at a disadvantage as to the number of safe seats predicted to fall in their column. They did it by winning all the seats that were “Leaning GOP” and 10 of the 21 seats “Leaning DFL.”

## Findings

### Minnesota profile

Applying this analysis to 1996 and 1998 election results, the house and senate districts have the following profile going into the 2000 elections:



## Our predictions

Given the results of the demonstration of the model, we believe we can predict the results of the 2000 elections with a high degree of confidence.

	<u>Prediction</u>	<u>House</u>	<u>Senate</u>
	DFL	57	26
	GOP	35	16
	Not called	42	25
	<b>Total</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>67</b>

We are predicting the results of 67 percent of the winners in the House of Representatives and 63 percent of the winners in the Senate one year ahead of the elections - without even knowing the candidates or issues, and without taking a poll of the voters. On the following pages the profile and prediction is broken down for each district, with maps showing the predicted election outcome in each district.

Of special interest in the 2000 election is the potential impact of Reform Party candidates. Included in this report on the tables and maps are the districts where Reform Party candidates could most significantly affect the election results. It is not a prediction of Reform Party victory, though we do not rule that out. Rather it is a statement of the Reform Party's demonstrated strength compared to relative lack of dominance by either DFL or GOP candidates. The significance is that these districts could very well elect representatives and senators receiving less than a majority of the vote, leaving the wishes of the majority in doubt. We have identified 34 House districts and 20 Senate districts that have Reform Party potential impact.

## District profiles and predictions

The tables in this section detail our assessment of the competitiveness of each district and predict the results of the elections in November 2000. The far right column indicates the top districts in which the Reform Party could significantly affect the elections if it fielded candidates in those districts. Each table is followed by a summary of the analysis.


**Table: 2000 election predictions-Minnesota House of Representatives**

District	96-98 DFL Avg. %	96-98 GOP Avg. %	96-98 Reform Avg. %	96-98 Other Avg. %	96-98 DFL-GOP Difference	Change from 96-98 94-96 Difference	96-98 District Profile	98 Winner	2000 Predicted Winner	Reform Party Potential Impact
01A	58.6%	38.2%	3.2%	0.0%	20.4%	8.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
01B	57.6%	39.0%	3.3%	0.0%	18.6%	7.5%	Comfortable DFL	GOP	DFL	
02A	62.3%	34.5%	3.3%	0.0%	27.8%	8.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
02B	58.2%	37.8%	4.0%	0.0%	20.5%	4.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
03A	64.2%	30.5%	5.2%	0.0%	33.7%	0.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
03B	65.4%	28.5%	6.1%	0.0%	36.9%	4.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
04A	50.8%	42.9%	6.3%	0.0%	8.0%	4.8%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	
04B	49.7%	43.0%	7.3%	0.0%	6.7%	0.2%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
05A	72.8%	21.5%	5.7%	0.0%	51.4%	4.1%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
05B	71.3%	22.9%	5.8%	0.0%	48.4%	3.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
06A	65.6%	28.1%	6.3%	0.0%	37.5%	7.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
06B	59.0%	33.8%	7.3%	0.0%	25.2%	-1.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
07A	66.4%	21.7%	7.3%	4.6%	44.7%	1.4%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
07B	62.6%	29.2%	8.1%	0.0%	33.4%	2.6%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
08A	66.5%	27.7%	5.8%	0.0%	38.7%	6.9%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
08B	58.9%	31.8%	9.3%	0.0%	27.0%	2.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
09A	49.7%	46.9%	3.4%	0.0%	2.9%	11.4%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
09B	54.7%	40.9%	4.3%	0.0%	13.8%	4.5%	Comfortable DFL	GOP	DFL	
10A	46.4%	48.5%	5.1%	0.0%	-2.0%	3.1%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
10B	46.8%	46.8%	6.4%	0.0%	-0.1%	24.3%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform


District	96-98 DFL Avg. %	96-98 GOP Avg. %	96-98 Reform Avg. %	96-98 Other Avg. %	96-98 DFL-GOP Difference	Change from 94-96 Difference	96-98 District Profile	98 Winner	2000 Predicted Winner	Reform Party Potential Impact
11A	41.2%	54.3%	4.5%	0.0%	-13.0%	-6.3%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
11B	54.8%	38.1%	7.1%	0.0%	16.6%	13.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
12A	51.5%	40.5%	8.0%	0.0%	11.0%	-1.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
12B	54.2%	36.8%	8.9%	0.0%	17.4%	1.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
13A	49.3%	38.3%	6.5%	5.9%	10.9%	-2.8%	Comfortable DFL	GOP	DFL	
13B	59.1%	29.1%	7.1%	4.8%	30.0%	10.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
14A	46.6%	45.7%	7.8%	0.0%	0.9%	10.8%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
14B	42.8%	49.1%	8.1%	0.0%	-6.3%	-0.4%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
15A	50.3%	42.1%	7.6%	0.0%	8.2%	6.3%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	
15B	50.4%	39.2%	10.5%	0.0%	11.2%	10.7%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
16A	55.2%	36.9%	7.9%	0.0%	18.3%	11.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
16B	46.1%	46.5%	7.4%	0.0%	-0.3%	9.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
17A	45.8%	42.5%	11.7%	0.0%	3.2%	9.1%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
17B	48.3%	38.3%	13.4%	0.0%	10.0%	8.6%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
18A	46.8%	40.2%	13.0%	0.0%	6.6%	2.2%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
18B	50.7%	36.9%	12.4%	0.0%	13.8%	-1.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
19A	40.9%	46.5%	12.6%	0.0%	-5.6%	1.8%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
19B	39.2%	49.3%	11.6%	0.0%	-10.1%	-2.1%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	Reform
20A	38.2%	51.0%	10.7%	0.0%	-12.8%	15.9%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
20B	39.9%	47.9%	12.3%	0.0%	-8.0%	8.7%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
21A	43.8%	49.2%	7.0%	0.0%	-5.4%	6.1%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
21B	46.3%	49.5%	4.2%	0.0%	-3.1%	1.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
22A	59.2%	34.8%	6.1%	0.0%	24.4%	5.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
22B	51.7%	41.6%	6.7%	0.0%	10.1%	2.5%	Comfortable DFL	GOP	DFL	
23A	37.2%	55.6%	7.2%	0.0%	-18.4%	7.1%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
23B	40.7%	49.0%	10.2%	0.0%	-8.3%	1.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
24A	51.9%	40.6%	7.5%	0.0%	11.2%	-0.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
24B	46.4%	43.1%	10.5%	0.0%	3.3%	-4.2%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
25A	47.4%	44.7%	7.9%	0.0%	2.6%	-0.5%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
25B	41.5%	50.2%	8.3%	0.0%	-8.7%	-0.4%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	
26A	32.8%	59.3%	7.8%	0.0%	-26.5%	-7.3%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
26B	51.6%	40.9%	7.4%	0.0%	10.7%	4.9%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
27A	46.4%	48.8%	4.9%	0.0%	-2.4%	-1.7%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
27B	59.6%	36.0%	4.4%	0.0%	23.7%	0.0%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
28A	35.8%	56.8%	7.4%	0.0%	-20.9%	-1.7%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
28B	32.6%	59.7%	7.8%	0.0%	-27.1%	-0.6%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
29A	43.9%	47.7%	8.4%	0.0%	-3.8%	-0.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
29B	39.7%	52.7%	7.6%	0.0%	-13.0%	-2.4%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
30A	25.7%	69.2%	5.2%	0.0%	-43.5%	-10.4%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
30B	34.3%	58.0%	7.7%	0.0%	-23.7%	4.2%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
31A	30.1%	61.3%	6.0%	2.5%	-31.2%	10.7%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
31B	39.6%	55.1%	5.3%	0.0%	-15.5%	16.3%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
32A	52.6%	43.2%	4.2%	0.0%	9.4%	-2.2%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	
32B	35.9%	59.7%	4.4%	0.0%	-23.8%	1.9%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
33A	30.0%	58.6%	11.4%	0.0%	-28.6%	-2.7%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
33B	27.5%	62.7%	9.8%	0.0%	-35.2%	1.1%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
34A	33.8%	56.2%	10.0%	0.0%	-22.5%	0.7%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
34B	22.0%	71.4%	6.6%	0.0%	-49.4%	-0.9%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
35A	33.5%	51.9%	14.6%	0.0%	-18.5%	5.1%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
35B	48.9%	39.9%	11.2%	0.0%	9.0%	-3.2%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
36A	42.1%	50.7%	7.2%	0.0%	-8.6%	1.3%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	
36B	32.7%	60.0%	7.3%	0.0%	-27.4%	-0.4%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
37A	34.2%	56.6%	9.2%	0.0%	-22.4%	13.3%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
37B	35.6%	53.7%	10.7%	0.0%	-18.0%	0.2%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
38A	43.1%	50.3%	6.7%	0.0%	-7.2%	0.7%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	
38B	34.9%	58.0%	7.0%	0.0%	-23.1%	8.6%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
39A	53.0%	39.5%	7.5%	0.0%	13.5%	-2.6%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
39B	55.3%	35.5%	9.2%	0.0%	19.8%	-1.7%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
40A	47.2%	44.5%	8.4%	0.0%	2.7%	-0.1%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
40B	41.6%	51.3%	7.0%	0.0%	-9.7%	3.9%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	
41A	20.3%	74.0%	5.7%	0.0%	-53.7%	-7.7%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
41B	30.7%	61.8%	7.5%	0.0%	-31.1%	-0.8%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
42A	34.3%	61.3%	4.4%	0.0%	-27.1%	12.8%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
42B	25.6%	69.0%	5.4%	0.0%	-43.4%	-1.8%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
43A	30.8%	61.7%	7.4%	0.0%	-30.9%	1.2%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
43B	29.0%	64.7%	6.3%	0.0%	-35.6%	-1.1%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
44A	47.8%	44.6%	7.5%	0.0%	3.2%	-0.8%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
44B	51.1%	41.6%	7.2%	0.0%	9.5%	0.5%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	
45A	31.2%	62.1%	6.7%	0.0%	-30.9%	1.9%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
45B	40.0%	52.9%	7.1%	0.0%	-12.8%	1.0%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
46A	53.7%	38.3%	8.0%	0.0%	15.4%	1.0%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
46B	55.1%	36.4%	8.6%	0.0%	18.7%	2.3%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
47A	44.2%	43.6%	12.2%	0.0%	0.6%	-0.5%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
47B	48.4%	42.4%	9.2%	0.0%	6.1%	2.0%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
48A	37.8%	51.7%	10.4%	0.0%	-13.9%	-3.9%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
48B	53.4%	36.8%	9.9%	0.0%	16.6%	2.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
49A	44.0%	45.8%	10.2%	0.0%	-1.9%	8.7%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform

District	96-98 DFL Avg. %	96-98 GOP Avg. %	96-98 Reform Avg. %	96-98 Other Avg. %	96-98 DFL-GOP Difference	Change from 94-96 Difference	96-98 District Profile	98 Winner	2000 Predicted Winner	Reform Party Potential Impact									
49B	48.7%	40.5%	10.8%	0.0%	8.2%	-1.1%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform									
50A	44.7%	44.2%	11.2%	0.0%	0.5%	1.9%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform									
50B	40.8%	49.0%	10.1%	0.0%	-8.2%	2.8%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform									
51A	48.0%	41.8%	10.2%	0.0%	6.3%	-0.2%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform									
51B	42.0%	48.9%	9.1%	0.0%	-6.9%	2.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform									
52A	53.6%	38.0%	8.4%	0.0%	15.6%	2.9%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL										
52B	46.4%	43.1%	10.5%	0.0%	3.3%	-0.6%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform									
53A	39.5%	53.7%	6.8%	0.0%	-14.2%	-0.4%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP										
53B	40.7%	52.2%	7.1%	0.0%	-11.4%	-2.3%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP										
54A	51.3%	42.6%	6.2%	0.0%	8.7%	-1.3%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called										
54B	52.9%	39.9%	7.2%	0.0%	13.0%	0.8%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL										
55A	42.1%	49.4%	8.5%	0.0%	-7.3%	-1.4%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform									
55B	53.9%	37.5%	8.6%	0.0%	16.4%	1.3%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL										
56A	40.2%	52.1%	7.8%	0.0%	-11.9%	-2.5%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP										
56B	40.2%	52.4%	7.4%	0.0%	-12.2%	-6.1%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP										
57A	48.8%	42.8%	8.4%	0.0%	6.0%	-4.2%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform									
57B	55.0%	34.6%	10.4%	0.0%	20.3%	0.0%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
58A	65.9%	25.1%	9.0%	0.0%	40.8%	4.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
58B	80.4%	14.3%	5.3%	0.0%	66.1%	4.4%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
59A	64.9%	24.8%	8.7%	1.6%	40.0%	1.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
59B	66.2%	25.3%	8.5%	0.0%	41.0%	-0.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
60A	68.4%	26.5%	5.1%	0.0%	41.8%	-2.6%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
60B	68.8%	24.1%	7.2%	0.0%	44.7%	-2.6%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
61A	77.3%	16.2%	6.5%	0.0%	61.1%	1.9%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
61B	78.1%	13.9%	8.0%	0.0%	64.1%	0.4%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
62A	70.3%	18.8%	7.8%	3.1%	51.5%	1.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
62B	65.8%	25.9%	8.3%	0.0%	39.9%	0.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
63A	62.6%	31.9%	5.5%	0.0%	30.7%	1.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
63B	55.5%	37.1%	7.4%	0.0%	18.4%	1.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL										
64A	65.4%	29.1%	5.5%	0.0%	36.2%	-2.6%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
64B	57.5%	37.0%	5.2%	0.3%	20.6%	-7.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
65A	75.1%	19.1%	5.8%	0.0%	55.9%	-3.0%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
65B	65.6%	26.6%	7.8%	0.0%	38.9%	-2.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
66A	61.2%	29.0%	8.5%	1.3%	32.2%	-12.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
66B	64.0%	29.2%	6.8%	0.0%	34.9%	1.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
67A	58.9%	28.9%	12.2%	0.0%	30.0%	-4.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
67B	57.7%	32.7%	9.6%	0.0%	25.0%	-2.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL										
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">23 Leaning DFL</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">19 Leaning GOP</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">42 Total "Marginal" Competitive Seats</div> </td> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">36 Untouchable DFL +</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">21 Untouchable GOP +</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">57 Total Untouchables</div> </td> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">21 Comfortable DFL =</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">14 Comfortable GOP =</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">35 Total Comfortables</div> </td> <td style="width: 25%; padding: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">57 Predicted DFL Winners</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">35 Predicted GOP Winners</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">92 Total "Safe" Predictable Seats</div> </td> <td style="width: 10%; padding: 5px; vertical-align: middle;">34 Reform Potential Impact Districts</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="4" style="text-align: center; padding: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">Partisan split after 1998 63 DFL 71 GOP</div> </td> </tr> </table>											<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">23 Leaning DFL</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">19 Leaning GOP</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">42 Total "Marginal" Competitive Seats</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">36 Untouchable DFL +</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">21 Untouchable GOP +</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">57 Total Untouchables</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">21 Comfortable DFL =</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">14 Comfortable GOP =</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">35 Total Comfortables</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">57 Predicted DFL Winners</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; margin-bottom: 2px;">35 Predicted GOP Winners</div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">92 Total "Safe" Predictable Seats</div>	34 Reform Potential Impact Districts	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 5px auto; width: 80%;">Partisan split after 1998 63 DFL 71 GOP</div>			
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**Map – Greater Minnesota: 2000 election predictions - Minnesota House of Representative**



Map – metropolitan area: 2000 election predictions - Minnesota House of Representatives






**Table: 2000 election predictions-Minnesota Senate**


District	96-98 DFL Avg. %	96-98 GOP Avg. %	96-98 Reform Avg. %	96-98 Other Avg. %	96-98 DFL- GOP Difference	Change from 94-96 Difference	96-98 District Profile	96 Winner	2000 Predicted Winner	Reform Party likely impact
SD01	58.1%	38.6%	3.3%	0.0%	19.5%	7.8%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD02	60.2%	36.1%	3.7%	0.0%	24.1%	6.4%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD03	64.8%	29.5%	5.7%	0.0%	35.4%	2.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD04	50.2%	42.9%	6.8%	0.0%	7.3%	2.4%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	
SD05	72.1%	22.1%	5.8%	0.0%	50.0%	3.9%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD06	62.5%	30.8%	6.8%	0.0%	31.7%	3.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD07	64.6%	25.4%	7.7%	2.3%	39.2%	2.1%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD08	62.4%	29.9%	7.7%	0.0%	32.5%	4.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD09	52.5%	43.5%	3.9%	0.0%	9.0%	7.5%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	
SD10	46.6%	47.6%	5.8%	0.0%	-1.0%	12.9%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD11	48.3%	45.9%	5.8%	0.0%	2.4%	4.3%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD12	52.8%	38.7%	8.5%	0.0%	14.1%	-0.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD13	54.0%	33.8%	6.8%	5.4%	20.2%	3.8%	Untouchable DFL	Other	DFL	
SD14	44.6%	47.4%	7.9%	0.0%	-2.8%	4.9%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD15	50.3%	40.6%	9.0%	0.0%	9.7%	8.6%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	
SD16	50.5%	41.9%	7.6%	0.0%	8.6%	10.3%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	
SD17	47.0%	40.3%	12.6%	0.0%	6.7%	9.0%	Leaning DFL	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD18	48.9%	38.5%	12.6%	0.0%	10.4%	0.4%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	Reform
SD19	40.0%	47.9%	12.1%	0.0%	-7.8%	-0.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD20	39.0%	49.5%	11.5%	0.0%	-10.4%	12.0%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	Reform
SD21	45.1%	49.3%	5.6%	0.0%	-4.3%	3.5%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD22	55.4%	38.2%	6.4%	0.0%	17.1%	4.1%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD23	38.9%	52.3%	8.8%	0.0%	-13.4%	4.2%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD24	48.9%	41.9%	9.2%	0.0%	6.9%	-2.5%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD25	44.6%	47.3%	8.1%	0.0%	-2.7%	-0.4%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD26	43.4%	49.0%	7.6%	0.0%	-5.6%	0.0%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD27	52.8%	42.6%	4.6%	0.0%	10.2%	-1.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD28	34.2%	58.2%	7.6%	0.0%	-24.0%	-1.2%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD29	41.8%	50.2%	8.0%	0.0%	-8.4%	-1.3%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	
SD30	29.7%	63.9%	6.4%	0.0%	-34.2%	-3.5%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD31	34.7%	58.4%	5.7%	1.3%	-23.7%	13.3%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD32	44.4%	51.3%	4.3%	0.0%	-7.0%	0.4%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	
SD33	29.1%	60.3%	10.7%	0.0%	-31.2%	-1.0%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD34	27.6%	64.3%	8.1%	0.0%	-36.7%	-0.1%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD35	40.9%	46.2%	12.9%	0.0%	-5.3%	0.2%	Leaning GOP	GOP	Not called	Reform
SD36	37.8%	54.9%	7.2%	0.0%	-17.1%	0.7%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	Not called	
SD37	35.2%	54.7%	10.1%	0.0%	-19.5%	5.8%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD38	39.3%	53.9%	6.8%	0.0%	-14.6%	4.1%	Comfortable GOP	DFL	GOP	
SD39	54.2%	37.5%	8.4%	0.0%	16.7%	-2.0%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD40	44.1%	48.2%	7.6%	0.0%	-4.1%	2.1%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD41	26.2%	67.2%	6.7%	0.0%	-41.0%	-3.4%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD42	29.8%	65.2%	4.9%	0.0%	-35.4%	4.9%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD43	30.0%	63.1%	6.9%	0.0%	-33.1%	0.2%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD44	49.5%	43.1%	7.4%	0.0%	6.4%	-0.2%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD45	35.4%	57.7%	6.9%	0.0%	-22.3%	1.5%	Untouchable GOP	GOP	Not called	
SD46	54.4%	37.3%	8.3%	0.0%	17.1%	1.7%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD47	46.5%	42.9%	10.6%	0.0%	3.6%	0.9%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD48	44.8%	45.0%	10.2%	0.0%	-0.2%	-1.6%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD49	46.1%	43.4%	10.5%	0.0%	2.8%	4.1%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD50	42.6%	46.8%	10.6%	0.0%	-4.2%	2.4%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD51	44.6%	45.8%	9.6%	0.0%	-1.2%	1.3%	Leaning GOP	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD52	50.0%	40.5%	9.5%	0.0%	9.5%	1.1%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	
SD53	40.1%	52.9%	7.0%	0.0%	-12.8%	-1.4%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD54	52.1%	41.2%	6.7%	0.0%	10.8%	-0.3%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD55	47.5%	44.0%	8.5%	0.0%	3.4%	-0.3%	Leaning DFL	DFL	Not called	Reform
SD56	40.2%	52.3%	7.6%	0.0%	-12.1%	-4.6%	Comfortable GOP	GOP	GOP	
SD57	51.7%	38.9%	9.3%	0.0%	12.8%	-2.2%	Comfortable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD58	70.8%	21.4%	7.8%	0.0%	49.4%	4.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD59	65.4%	25.0%	8.6%	0.9%	40.4%	0.8%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD60	68.6%	25.3%	6.2%	0.0%	43.3%	-2.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD61	77.7%	14.9%	7.4%	0.0%	62.8%	1.1%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD62	67.8%	22.6%	8.1%	1.4%	45.2%	0.9%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD63	59.5%	34.2%	6.4%	0.0%	25.3%	1.3%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD64	61.4%	33.1%	5.3%	0.1%	28.3%	-5.2%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD65	70.0%	23.1%	6.9%	0.0%	46.9%	-2.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD66	62.9%	29.1%	7.5%	0.5%	33.8%	-3.5%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	
SD67	58.3%	30.9%	10.8%	0.0%	27.4%	-3.7%	Untouchable DFL	DFL	DFL	

	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>12 Leaning DFL</td> <td>17 Untouchable DFL +</td> <td>9 Comfortable DFL =</td> <td>26 Predicted DFL</td> <td rowspan="3">20 Reform Potential Impact Districts</td> </tr> <tr> <td>13 Leaning GOP</td> <td>9 Untouchable GOP +</td> <td>7 Comfortable GOP =</td> <td>Winners 16 Predicted GOP Winners</td> </tr> <tr> <td>25 Total "Marginal" Competitive Seats</td> <td>26 Total Untouchables</td> <td>16 Total Comfortables</td> <td>42 Total "Safe" Predictable Seats</td> </tr> </table>	12 Leaning DFL	17 Untouchable DFL +	9 Comfortable DFL =	26 Predicted DFL	20 Reform Potential Impact Districts	13 Leaning GOP	9 Untouchable GOP +	7 Comfortable GOP =	Winners 16 Predicted GOP Winners	25 Total "Marginal" Competitive Seats	26 Total Untouchables	16 Total Comfortables	42 Total "Safe" Predictable Seats
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Map – Greater Minnesota: 2000 election predictions - Minnesota Senate



Map – metropolitan area: 2000 election predictions - Minnesota Senate



## Discussion

### Majority rule

The effect that redistricting has had on representation in the Minnesota legislature should be noted. In 1991, the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party in the legislature created a district map, which it presented to the Republican governor. The expectation of conventional wisdom was that it would be vetoed and ultimately sent to the courts to draw the boundaries, as had happened each decade going back many years. The governor's office mishandled the legal requirements for a veto and, in short, a flubbed veto meant the DFL plan was allowed to become law.

The result was that the DFL received more than its fair share of legislative seats. In 1994 and 1996, Minnesota even had minority rule in its House of Representatives. In 1994, Republicans received 53 percent of the statewide vote, but only 47 percent of the legislative seats. In 1996, the Republicans again received more votes, but fewer seats, than the Democrats did. The Democrats ruled even though they received a minority of the votes, and fewer votes than the Republicans.

### Reform party impact

With the Reform Party hoping to field candidates for state legislative races, there is a real possibility that many of those seats will be decided by less than a majority of the voters. This means that the majority in a district could divide their votes between their two favored candidates, resulting in the election of a candidate opposed by the majority. It is not known whether the Reform Party will succeed in recruiting a substantial number of candidates. However, our analysis shows that their presence could affect the outcome of 25 to 30 percent of the seats.

Even three seats considered safe for either the DFL or GOP that are facing potential Reform Party impact. Representative Bruce Anderson (R-19B) represents one of these districts on the ex-urban fringe of the metropolitan area, part of the "doughnut" where the Reform Party has shown strength. Senator Steve Dille (R-20) has a rural district with Reform Party potential. The seat in district 18 was vacated by the death of Senator Janet Johnson and is being filled by special election on the date of publication of this report. Each of these could have surprising results in the 2000 elections.

However, the real possibility for Reform Party impact are in the 33 House districts and 18 Senate districts which show Reform Party strength without dominance by either the DFL or GOP. These are clustered across the northern tier of the suburban and ex-urban region of the metropolitan area.

Incumbents in affected districts include Representatives Jim Knoblach, Sondra Erickson, Leslie Schumacher, Jim Rostberg, Mark Olson, Darlene Luther, former speaker Phil Carruthers, Jim Abeler, Luanne Koskinen, Tom Hackbarth, Kathy Tingelstad, Andrew

Westerberg, and Ray Vandever. Senators in close districts in the north ex-urban/suburban tier with Reform Party strength include Dan Stevens, Mark Ourada, Arlene Lesewski, Linda Scheid, Don Betzold, Leo Foley, Paula Hanson, and Jane Krentz.

### Single-member plurality districts

Not all problems of representation are due to non-competitive elections. If all districts were drawn so they were competitive, there would likely be undesirable effects of that as well. The deeper problem lies with the nature of single-member plurality elections.

One of the features of the plurality-winner, single-member district system is the possibility and even likelihood of a distortion between the percentage of the votes a party's candidates receive and the percentage of the seats the party wins. Minnesota's legislative elections are no exception. As noted above, the Minnesota House of Representatives was under minority rule in 1994 and 1996. The Senate, while not subject to minority rule, had an even larger votes-to-seats distortion in the 1996 election. The DFL received 54 percent of the votes. However, that translated into 63 percent of the seats. Republicans were notably underrepresented in the Senate, receiving 45 percent of the votes, but only 36 percent of the seats. In 1998, the Republicans made up the difference in the House elections. For 2000, it is unclear what the final make up of the House and Senate elections will be. We urge political observers to monitor the relation between votes received and seats won.

**Table: Votes-to-seats distortion: Minnesota House of Representatives**

<u>Party results</u>	<u>1994</u>	<u>1996</u>	<u>1998</u>
DFL % seats	53%	52%	47%
DFL % votes	47%	49%	47%
<b>DFL votes to seats distortion (% seats minus % votes)</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>0%</b>
GOP % seats	47%	48%	53%
GOP % votes	53%	49%	52%
<b>GOP votes to seats distortion (% seats minus % votes)</b>	<b>-6%</b>	<b>-2%</b>	<b>1%</b>

**Table: Votes-to-seats distortion: Minnesota Senate**

<u>Party results</u>	<u>1996</u>
DFL % seats	63%
DFL % votes	54%
<b>DFL votes to seats distortion (% seats minus % votes)</b>	<b>9%</b>
GOP % seats	36%
GOP % votes	45%
<b>GOP votes to seats distortion (% seats minus % votes)</b>	<b>-9%</b>

### Alternative election systems

The key to solving the problem of non-competitive elections and gerrymandering is to change from a single-member plurality election system to a system of proportional representation. Proportional representation is the principle that every voter should be able to

help elect someone he or she approves of, and that groupings of like-minded voters win representation in proportion to their share of the total vote.

A proportional system would improve either a bicameral or a unicameral legislature, which is currently being proposed by Governor Ventura and others. There are systems that lend themselves to nonpartisan elections (which Governor Ventura has proposed) and others which work with partisan elections (which are currently used to elect the legislature). Two changes are needed to make a proportional system possible:

1. Single member districts (districts which elect only one winner) must be changed to multimember districts (where there are several winners)
2. Plurality elections (the one with the most votes wins and everyone else loses) must be replaced with a method which achieves proportional results (voters are represented in proportion to their share of the total vote, e.g., 60 percent of the voters elect 60 percent of the seats, 40 percent of the voters elect 40 percent of the seats)

### **Multimember districts**

Here is how multimember districts could be structured. For example, in a 134-member House of Representatives, there could be 27 districts, each electing approximately five representatives. The exact number would be determined according to the population in each district. It might be desirable for sparsely populated rural areas to have smaller districts with fewer members. Each district would meet the Supreme Courts “one person, one vote” requirement.

Another option is to create eight districts aligning with the state’s congressional districts, with the members apportioned equally between them. Or there could be one statewide “district.”

### **Proportional elections**

There are several election systems that accomplish proportionality to a greater or lesser degree. There are many variations on each system, and an election system can be tailored to meet the needs and choices of the state. Here is a brief description:

#### ***Choice Voting***

Often used in nonpartisan elections, voters cast their vote for individual candidates. But instead of simply marking the ballot for one candidate, the voter ranks the candidates in order of choice. (First choice, second choice, third choice, etc.) The vote goes to the first choice candidate. If 10 percent of the vote is required to win election, and a candidate receives, for example, 20 percent of the vote, then those who voted for that candidate only need half of their vote to elect that candidate. The other half of each vote then goes to help elect their next choice. Also known as “Single Transferable Vote,” this system has a history of use in the United States. It is used in Cambridge, Massachusetts to elect the city council and school board, where it enjoys popular support.

### *Cumulative Voting*

Voters have as many votes as there are seats to be filled. However, unlike an at-large, winner-take-all election, voters can concentrate their votes on just a few candidates or even on one candidate. For example, a voter with five votes could spread them among five candidates. Or the voter could give three votes to one and two votes to another. Or all five votes could go to just one candidate. This system also has a history of use in the United States, having been used to elect the Illinois legislature for 110 years after the Civil War. It was chosen as a way to provide healing and better representation for all parts of the state, which had been divided over the war. It is currently used in nearly 60 jurisdictions, particularly in Texas, primarily as a means to resolve disputes raised under the Voting Rights Act. Both Cumulative Voting and Choice Voting are approved by the United State Department of Justice as systems that can assure majority rule while also providing fair representation for minorities. However, unlike Choice Voting, Cumulative Voting is usually categorized as “semi-proportional” due to the inconsistency with which it delivers proportional results.

### *Party List*

Each party nominates a list of its candidates for the seats to be filled. The number of winning candidates from each party is proportional to the party’s share of the total votes cast in the election. For example, if there were 10 seats to be filled and a party received 30 percent of the vote, that party’s candidates would fill three of the 10 seats. Usually, voters cast a vote for the party of their choice. However, there are variations on this system in which voters cast votes for individual candidates, rather than for parties. Party List is the most commonly used system of proportional representation, and is used by most of the world’s major democracies.

### *Hybrid systems*

There are systems that combine features of more than one election system. For example, the German system combines single member plurality elections with a party list system. The Australians use a combination of party list and choice voting to elect their Senate. Many variations are possible to fit the particular needs of the situation.